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Articles 
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING ON WISCONSIN’S EFFORTS TO 
DEAL WITH LOW-LEVEL DRUG OFFENDERS 
Lynn Adelman∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I thank the Valparaiso University Law School for the opportunity to 
participate in an important discussion about how we can most effectively 
address the problem of low-level drug offenders.  This issue is timely 
because of the harmful consequences that many jurisdictions’ sentencing 
practices have brought about, particularly in the African-American 
community.1  I will attempt to contribute to the discussion by exploring 
Wisconsin’s experience with a type of determinate sentencing that many 
states have adopted in recent decades known as truth in sentencing 
(“TIS”).  My interest in Wisconsin’s TIS law stems both from my 
experience as a federal district judge (1997–present) and as a Wisconsin 
state senator (1977–1997).  As a district judge, I have had to deal with the 
federal version of determinate sentencing embodied in the Sentencing 
Reform Act (“SRA”), the federal sentencing guidelines, and statutes 
establishing mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases.2  I have long 
been convinced that the federal sentencing laws and guidelines result in 
an enormous amount of over-punishment, particularly in drug cases.  
                                                 
∗ Lynn Adelman is a U.S. District Judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.  Judge 
Adelman thanks Jonah Kind and Barbara Fritschel for their research assistance and 
Meredith Ross for her helpful comments. 
1 See generally Donna K. Axel & David M. Rosen, Putting Two Drug Courts to the Top Ten 
Test:  Comparing Essex and Denver Drug Courts with “The Carey Team’s” Best Practices, 47 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 839 (2013) (evaluating the effectiveness of various drug courts to reduce 
recidivism); Jeanne Bishop, Where the Rubber Meets the Road:  Injecting Mercy into a System of 
Justice, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 819 (2013) (discussing her experiences as a public defender in 
Cook County, Illinois, and how devastating the effects of the drug war have been on the 
African-American community); Brian G. Gilmore & Reginald Dwayne Betts, Deconstructing 
Carmona: The U.S. War on Drugs and Black Men as Non-Citizens, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 777 (2013) 
(exploring how the war on drugs has affected the African-American community). 
2 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3661–3672 (2006)).  See generally Mark Osler, Amoral Numbers and 
Narcotics Sentencing, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 755 (2013) (“[T]he arbitrary mandatory 
minimums and sentencing guidelines . . . have too often created broad and often tragic 
outcomes in our society.”). 
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Wisconsin enacted its TIS law in 1998.3  I thought that it might be useful 
to explore how TIS came to be enacted in Wisconsin and to consider 
whether the law has had negative consequences similar to those 
resulting from the SRA.  Unfortunately, as discussed below, I conclude 
that it has. 
Like many states, when Wisconsin enacted TIS, it abandoned an 
indeterminate sentencing system that had been in effect for many years.  
Under the indeterminate system, most offenders became eligible for 
parole after serving 25% of their sentence and had to be paroled after 
serving two-thirds of it.4  When it enacted TIS, however, Wisconsin 
abolished parole.5  It also abolished the right of an offender to earn credit 
for good behavior (“good time”) while in prison.6  Under TIS, when a 
judge sentences an offender to prison, the judge imposes a bifurcated 
sentence consisting of a term of confinement of at least one year followed 
by a term of extended supervision (“ES”) in the community.7  In addition 
to requiring offenders to serve their entire term of confinement, TIS 
established harsh rules regarding ES.  The ES portion of the bifurcated 
sentence has to be at least 25% as long as the term of confinement.8  
Further, offenders who violate ES and are returned to prison receive no 
sentence credit for time successfully served on ES prior to the violation.9 
Wisconsin’s TIS law is as harsh as any in the country.  By abolishing 
parole and good time, the law has led to a substantial increase in 
Wisconsin’s prison population and to skyrocketing corrections costs.10  
TIS has especially harmed efforts to deal constructively with low-level 
drug offenders.  The absence of readily available opportunities for early 
release deprives many offenders of an incentive to address substance 
abuse problems.  Also, the increased incarceration caused by TIS absorbs 
funds that could otherwise be used for drug treatment both for offenders 
in the prison system and on ES.  Further, the long periods of ES and the 
lapses that drug offenders frequently suffer ensnare many offenders in a 
                                                 
3 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 973.01 et. seq. (West 2007); Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and 
Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 15, 15 (2002).  See 
generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and Indiana’s Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 867 (2013) (discussing Indiana’s struggle to reform its sentencing practices). 
4 Hammer, supra note 3, at 15 & 18 n.4. 
5 WIS. STAT. § 973.01(6); Hammer, supra note 3, at 15. 
6 Michael B. Brennan & Donald V. Latorraca, Truth-in-Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin, 
WIS. LAW., May 2000, at 14, 17. 
7 Id. at 16. 
8 Id. at 17. 
9 Id. at 56. 
10 Mary Zahn & Gina Barton, Locked in:  The Price of Truth in Sentencing (Pt. 1), 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1. 
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vicious cycle of incarceration and reincarceration.  The system might 
fairly be described as prison on the installment plan. 
In the first section of this Article, I discuss how TIS came to be 
enacted in Wisconsin, and, in the second, I assess in more detail the 
impact that it has had. 
II.  THE ENACTMENT OF TIS 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control & Law 
Enforcement Act.11  The Act included a provision known as the Violent 
Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Program 
(“VOI/TIS”).12  VOI/TIS was part of an ongoing federal effort to ensure 
that sentences in criminal cases were both determinate and harsh.  Ten 
years earlier, Congress had enacted the SRA, which abolished parole and 
substantially restricted the availability of good time at the federal level.13  
The VOI/TIS program provided incentives for states to adopt similar 
laws, offering funding to any state that required offenders who 
committed violent crimes to serve at least 85% of the sentence specified 
by the sentencing judge.14  The law did not require states to establish 
determinate sentences for non-violent offenses, including drug crimes.  
Some states enacted TIS laws before the federal program took effect, but 
the program encouraged more to do so.  By 2002, forty states had 
enacted TIS laws.15 
In Wisconsin, federal funding was only a small part of the TIS story.  
Individual political ambition played a bigger role.  As stated, before 
Wisconsin enacted a TIS law, it had an indeterminate sentencing system 
in which parole played an important part.  An agency known as the 
Wisconsin Parole Commission administered the parole system.  The 
Commission was chaired by an appointee of the governor, who served at 
                                                 
11 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15, 16, 18, 21, 28, 31); 
Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 619, 619 (1995). 
12 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 20101 et seq.; 
Environmental Impact Review Procedures for the VOI/TIS Grant Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 
48,592 (Aug. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 91). 
13 See generally WILLIAM W. WILKINS, JR., ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (1991) (providing the origins of mandatory minimum penalties and then evaluating 
their effectiveness). 
14 Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, Special Report:  Truth in Sentencing in State 
Prisons, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 3 (Jan. 1999), http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/tssp.pdf. 
15 Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XVI, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Mar. 
27, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/03/history-of-
wisconsin-sentencing-part_27.html.  
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the governor’s pleasure.16  The other members of the Commission, 
however, were state employees with civil service protection.17  The fact 
that the governor appointed the chair of the Commission ensured that 
the Commission was accountable to the electorate.  The fact that the 
commissioners had civil service protection was also important, because it 
meant that commissioners did not have to fear losing their job if they 
made a parole decision that didn’t work out well.  Thus, the system 
blended political accountability and professionalism.  The underlying 
idea was to de-politicize parole decisions and, insofar as possible, ensure 
that they were made on the merits. 
The commissioners traveled throughout Wisconsin interviewing 
prisoners who were coming up for consideration for parole and making 
recommendations to the Chair.  The Commission’s procedures and the 
manner in which it could exercise discretion were governed by written 
policies.18  In addition, the Commission was able to use its release 
authority to attempt to ensure that offenders with comparable records, 
offenses, and institutional conduct would serve approximately the same 
amount of time.  The system generally worked well.  Interested persons 
were aware of the policies and criteria that governed parole decisions or 
could easily discover them.  Anybody who cared could find out when a 
prisoner was coming up for parole.  In addition, victims were notified of 
parole hearings and could provide input.19  Thus, to characterize the 
system as something other than truth-in-sentencing, as TIS proponents 
did, was highly misleading. 
Nevertheless, in the United States, criminal justice issues are very 
politicized.  And the fact that tough-on-crime politics had been in vogue 
for several decades and that other states were adopting TIS laws made 
Wisconsin’s indeterminate sentencing system an attractive target for 
candidates for statewide office looking for issues to run on in 1994.  This 
was so despite statistics showing that in 1993 crime rates had dropped in 
almost every category of violent crime.20  Thus, in 1994, candidates 
challenging incumbents in campaigns for governor and attorney general 
came out strongly for enacting a TIS law.  Democratic State Senate 
Majority Leader Chuck Chvala, the challenger to Republican Governor 
                                                 
16 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.145(l) (West 2012) (allowing for the governor to appoint the 
chairperson); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.07(3m) (West 2003) (providing the governor with the 
power to remove the chairperson). 
17 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.145(l) (explaining that the other members who were appointed 
by the chairperson will serve a two-year term). 
18 WIS. ADMIN. CODE PAC §§ 1.01 et seq. (1995). 
19 WIS. ADMIN. CODE PAC § 1.05(2). 
20 Dennis McCann, Election-year Rhetoric Takes the Bite out of Upbeat Statistics on Crime, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1994. 
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Tommy Thompson, reinvented himself as a tough-on-crime politician 
and advocated eliminating parole for twenty-seven violent felonies.21  
Ironically, Chvala himself later went to jail after being charged with 
various kinds of official misconduct.22  Chvala’s assembly counterpart, 
Republican Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen, another vocal TIS supporter, 
was also convicted of a crime involving misconduct in office.23  In any 
case, Tommy Thompson, although an overwhelming favorite in the race 
against Chvala, had no intention of allowing himself to be outdone in the 
tough-on-crime department.  Thus, he responded to Chvala’s TIS 
proposal by proclaiming that he supported abolishing parole, not just for 
certain specified offenses, but for all offenses.24 
And even though the attorney general in Wisconsin has almost 
nothing to do with prosecuting street crime, the Republican challenger to 
Democratic Attorney General Jim Doyle, Jeff Wagner, a former Assistant 
U.S. Attorney and now a right wing talk radio host, ran a tough-on-crime 
campaign calling for the elimination of parole.  Wagner characterized 
parole as a “cruel joke” on the public and opined that dangerous people 
were being released “way too soon.”25  Doyle responded that parole 
should be subject to strict standards.26  The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
called the theme of the 1994 election “A Salute to Crime Busting” and 
lamented that the candidates would not let statistics get in the way of 
their tough-on-crime rhetoric.27 
Incumbents Thompson and Doyle were both re-elected, and, for a 
while after the 1994 election, neither said much about TIS.  Thompson 
appointed a task force to explore sentencing and corrections issues but 
expressed little interest in promoting TIS.28  However, in late 1996, 
Doyle, who by this time was contemplating a run for governor, released 
                                                 
21 Steve Schultze, Thompson Wants Parole to Halt for All State Crimes, MILWAUKEE J., 
Sept. 26, 1994. 
22 Chuck Chvala Timeline, CHANNEL3000 (last updated Dec. 15, 2005, 12:24 PM), 
http://www.channel3000.com/news/Chuck-Chvala-Timeline/-/1648/8290248/-/hlxqeez 
/-/index.html. 
23 Ann Babe, Jensen Officially Leaves Post, THE BADGER HERALD (Mar. 22, 2006, 12:00 AM), 
http://badgerherald.com/news/2006/03/22/jensen_officially_le.php. 
24 Schultze, supra note 21 (“‘When a police officer captures a criminal and a judge sends 
him to prison, he should stay there until his full sentence is served—period,’ [Gov.] 
Thompson said in his speech to the Wisconsin Professional Police Association.”). 
25 Craig Gilbert, Doyle Faces Republican Challenger, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 1, 1994; Eldon 
Knoche, Wagner Due to Announce Candidacy for Attorney General, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, 
Mar. 1, 1994, at 5A. 
26 Gilbert, supra note 25 (“Doyle does not favor total abolition of parole, but has said it 
should be subject to tight standards.”). 
27 McCann, supra note 20. 
28 Fontaine, supra note 15. 
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a fully developed TIS proposal.29  Doyle’s plan contemplated that only 
model inmates could be considered for parole and only after they had 
served 85% of their sentences.30  He argued that TIS would “build public 
confidence in the corrections system.”31  Doyle also proposed creating a 
sentencing commission to gather data and assist judges in modifying 
their sentencing practices to reflect the changes that a TIS law would 
bring about.32  He also advocated allocating 1% of the corrections budget 
to child abuse prevention.33 
Thompson, who perceived Doyle as a threat, responded with what 
he characterized as an “absolute” TIS proposal and included it in his 
1997–98 budget bill.34  Thompson dismissed Doyle’s proposal as “not 
real truth-in-sentencing” and supported abolishing parole entirely and 
requiring all offenders to serve 100% of their sentence.35  Other political 
actors also weighed in.  Judge Patrick Crooks, campaigning for a seat on 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, called for certainty in sentencing.36  
Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist suggested that parole be eliminated 
and unveiled a “Parole Stop” program calling for the City to oppose the 
early release of many inmates.37  Victims’ rights groups also initiated a 
petition drive supporting Doyle’s TIS proposal. 
Thus, the political momentum in support of TIS grew, even though 
Wisconsin’s crime rate continued to fall.  Between 1993 and 1998, the 
crime rate fell by almost 15%.38  However, partisan differences remained.  
Besides Thompson, the principal Republican proponent of TIS was State 
Representative and future Governor, Scott Walker.  Walker argued that 
TIS would provide the public with certainty about how much time an 
offender would serve in prison and would allow elected judges to make 
decisions about the length of incarceration rather than the unaccountable 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; see also Alan J. Borsuk, Thompson, Doyle Differ on Sentencing Overhaul, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, May 25, 1997, at 14A (“[Doyle] added, ‘What we clearly need is a commission 
that has a very direct and limited charge to revamp the penalties in our criminal code to 
put in effect truth in sentencing.’”). 
33 Fontaine, supra note 15. 
34 A.B. 100, 1997-98 Leg. (Wis. 1997). 
35 Fontaine, supra note 15. 
36 Richard P. Jones, Crooks Campaigning for Tough Crime Laws, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Jan. 26, 1996. 
37 Richard P. Jones, State Tab for Norquist Plan to End Parole Is Put at $35.7 Million, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1996, at 5B. 
38 Wisconsin Crime Rates 1960–2011, THE DISASTER CTR., http://www.disastercenter. 
com/crime/wicrime.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  In 1993, 204,244 total crimes were 
recorded in Wisconsin, and, in 1998, 185,093 total crimes were recorded.  Id. 
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Wisconsin Parole Commission.39  Walker denied that TIS was intended 
to make sentences longer.40  However, unlike Doyle’s proposal, 
Thompson’s proposal did not include a sentencing commission to assist 
judges in modifying their sentencing practices to take the abolition of 
parole into account.41  Walker argued that the elimination of parole 
would automatically cause judges to impose lower sentences.42 
Although Democrats declined to debate the ideas underlying the TIS 
proposal—that the parole system failed to provide the public with 
sufficient certainty about sentences and that judges, rather than the 
Parole Commission, should decide when prisoners should be released—
they criticized features of the Republican plan.  They disputed 
Republican claims that offenders would not serve longer sentences 
under TIS and argued that the state prison population and state 
corrections costs would increase substantially.43  The partisan 
disagreement led to the removal of TIS from the budget bill.44  In May 
1997, however, Walker and others introduced the Republican TIS 
proposal as a separate bill, Assembly Bill 351, which ultimately became 
the vehicle by which TIS was enacted in Wisconsin. 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) also played 
an important role in bringing TIS to Wisconsin.  ALEC is an organization 
that brings together fee-paying corporations and conservative state 
legislators to develop “model” legislative proposals.45  Its primary 
purpose is to develop bills that benefit its corporate members and further 
conservative causes.46  For example, ALEC has promoted “stand your 
ground” self-defense laws of the type at issue in the case involving the 
                                                 
39 Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin—Part XVII, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Mar. 30, 2007, 
2:48 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/03/history-of-wisconsin-part-
xvii.html. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (“Republicans repeatedly claimed that judges would control sentences on their 
own.  Rep. Mark Green . . . argued that judges ‘who have been giving out longer sentences 
in order to make sure inmates serve a specific time behind bars would probably give 
shorter sentences’ if offenders were guaranteed to serve their full terms.”). 
43 Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XVIII, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr. 
2, 2007, 9:14 AM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-of-
wisconsin-sentencing-part.html. 
44 Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XIX, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr. 
9, 2007, 2:41 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-of-
wisconsin-sentencing-part_09.html. 
45 Rachel Weiner, How ALEC Became a Political Liability, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/how-alec-became-a-political-
liability/2012/04/24/gIQA3QnyeT_blog.html  
46 Frequently Asked Questions, ALEC.ORG, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/frequently-
asked-questions/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
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death of Trayvon Martin, and “show me your papers” laws, such as 
Arizona adopted as part of its effort to deal with illegal immigration.47  
For decades, the National Rifle Association has “helped bankroll ALEC 
operations and even co-chaired ALEC’s ‘Public Safety and Elections Task 
Force[]’ . . . .”48 
During the 1990s, the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), 
the country’s largest operator of private prisons, was an active member 
of ALEC and pushed for the development of legislation that would 
increase the number of people incarcerated.49  Among the bills that 
ALEC developed was a model TIS law.  In 1995 alone, ALEC’s TIS 
proposal was signed into law in twenty-five states.50  Scott Walker was a 
member of ALEC, and the TIS bill that he introduced was based on 
ALEC’s model law.51  Walker also used statistics and talking points 
developed by ALEC to argue in support of his proposal.52 
Walker’s TIS bill passed the Assembly, but ran into trouble in the 
Democratic-controlled Senate.53  As discussed, the Senate was not 
opposed to TIS, but only to the harsh Republican version of it.  The 
Senate passed a TIS bill which required offenders to serve 75% rather 
than 100% of their sentence in custody.54  The Assembly killed the Senate 
version of TIS, characterizing it as a proposal that would “put criminals 
back on the street faster,” a curious statement in view of the assertion 
that TIS was about certainty rather than severity.55  Ultimately, 
Thompson and Doyle sat down and negotiated a TIS bill, and Thompson 
clearly got the better of Doyle in the negotiations.  Doyle agreed to accept 
Thompson’s proposal that offenders be required to serve 100% of their 
sentence.  In return, Thompson agreed to very little—a committee to 
address implementation issues and an increase in child abuse prevention 
funding.56  The legislature proceeded to pass the Thompson-Doyle 
                                                 
47 Weiner, supra note 45; John M. Gilionna, Arizona Immigration:  ‘Show Me Your Papers’ 
Enforcement to Begin, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/18/ 
nation/la-na-nn-arizona-immigration-20120918. 
48 Lisa Graves, Backgrounder:  The History of the NRA/ALEC Gun Agenda, PR WATCH (Dec. 
15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/12/11908/nraalec-reactionary-
gun-agenda. 
49 Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, THE NATION (Aug. 
1, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prison-
labor#. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Fontaine, supra note 44. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Fontaine, supra note 15. 
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“compromise,” and, in June 1998, Thompson signed it into law 
“proclaiming that it was ‘not a good day for the bad guys in Wisconsin,’” 
another odd statement given the stated purpose of the law.57 
Several points about the emergence and enactment of TIS legislation 
in Wisconsin are worth further mention.  First, few, if any, legislators 
made an effort to defend indeterminate sentencing, notwithstanding that 
the indeterminate sentencing system had served Wisconsin well for 
many years.  One argument against TIS laws is that it does not make 
sense to impose a punishment on an offender who is say 18, and never 
modify it no matter how much the offender may change in subsequent 
years.  Put differently, the argument is that a system that imposes the 
identical punishment on prisoners, without regard to their performance 
in prison, creates less prisoner accountability than a system that rewards 
prisoners who attempt to rehabilitate themselves.  Undoubtedly, this 
was a difficult argument to make, particularly when a Republican 
governor and a Democratic attorney general both supported the 
abolition of parole and good time.  But legislators were clearly reluctant 
even to suggest that some prisoners actually change for the better and 
that one of the responsibilities of an effective corrections system is to 
encourage such change. 
Second, during roughly the same period in which TIS was enacted, 
police in Milwaukee County began to arrest a large number of low-level 
crack offenders.58  At the same time, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney adopted a policy of seeking prison sentences in almost all drug 
cases.59  Further, judges in Milwaukee County began to express a lack of 
confidence in the probation system.60  The result of these occurrences 
was that very few low-level drug offenders in Milwaukee County 
received sentences of probation.61  Wisconsin judges generally sentenced 
low-level “possession with intent to sell” drug offenders to about two 
years.62  But in counties other than Milwaukee, judges generally placed 
the offenders on probation first.63  Thus, the prison sentence took effect 
only if probation was revoked.  Milwaukee County judges, however, 
                                                 
57 Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing–Part XX, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr. 13, 
2007, 9:04 AM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-of-wisconsin-
sentencing-part-xx.html. 
58 JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUST. STRATEGIES, TREATMENT INSTEAD OF PRISONS:  A 
ROADMAP FOR SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY REFORM IN WISCONSIN 31 (2006). 
59 Id. at 33. 
60 Id. at 22. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 46. 
63 Id. at 22. 
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sent most of these drug offenders directly to prison.64  Thus, Milwaukee 
County put more offenders in prison than all other counties put 
together.65  Further, some 80% to 90% of those Milwaukee County 
imprisoned were African-Americans.66  Unfortunately, neither the 
governor, the attorney general, nor the legislature made any effort to 
address the perceived problems with probation in Milwaukee County or 
the disproportionate imprisonment of low-level drug offenders who 
were African-American.  Instead, they chose to focus on enacting TIS. 
Third, there is an interesting parallel in the way that Wisconsin 
supporters of TIS promoted their bill and the way proponents of the SRA 
operated.  In both cases, proponents attempted to avoid placing primary 
emphasis on the fact that their proposals would result in much harsher 
sentences.  In the case of TIS, supporters like Walker emphasized that the 
bill would create certainty about how much time offenders would serve 
in prison and that this would be an important public benefit.  Proponents 
of the SRA also downplayed the punitive nature of their bill, stressing 
instead that it would reduce sentencing disparity and that this too would 
constitute an important public benefit.67  Both the certainty argument 
and the reducing disparity argument sounded relatively neutral and 
made the bills in question seem almost like good government bills, 
rather than legislation that would imprison a vast number of people—
mostly African-Americans—for a very long time.  Although clearly 
aware that the principal appeal of their bills was to the public’s punitive 
impulses, proponents seemed to want to avoid making the appeal 
embarrassingly blatant.  Thus, they came up with catchy but misleading 
labels like “truth-in-sentencing” and “sentencing reform.” 
In some states, like New York, policymakers have considerably 
reduced prison populations by establishing effective alternatives to 
prison for many drug offenders.68  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
however, Wisconsin was not among them.  Wisconsin has a history of 
progressivism in addressing criminal justice issues.  For example, it 
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66 Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution:  Early Assessments and State-Level 
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abolished the death penalty in 1853 and has never reinstated it.69  But in 
recent years, Wisconsin has been far from progressive. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF TIS 
In the decade after it took effect, TIS created so many problems that 
the legislature had to revise it at least three times.70  It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the legislature’s work on TIS provides an 
excellent case study in how not to legislate.  First, when it enacted TIS, 
the legislature delayed the law’s effective date until the end of 1999 to 
allow time to develop supplemental legislation that presumably had to 
be passed before TIS took effect.71  The legislature also created a Criminal 
Penalties Study Committee (“CPSC”) to draft such legislation.  The CPSC 
was intended to identify and propose changes made necessary by TIS 
and to provide sentencing guidance to judges in a world in which 
offenders could no longer be paroled. 
The expectation was that post-TIS sentences would be structured so 
that confinement periods would approximate the time offenders served 
in prison under the parole system.  In August 1999, the CPSC 
recommended numerous changes, including:  (1) the establishment of a 
new crime classification system with nine classes of offenses; (2) advisory 
sentencing guidelines; and (3) a sentencing commission to collect data 
about judicial sentencing practices.72  The CPSC based the new 
maximum periods of confinement on the time that offenders served 
before reaching their mandatory parole date under the old law.73  Of 
course, the CPSC could not ensure that judges would modify their 
sentencing practices to reflect that prisoners would no longer be paroled. 
Notwithstanding that the CPSC bill was supposed to be essential to 
TIS, it was not enacted until two and a half years after TIS took effect.74  
The CPSC legislation stalled because the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chair, Gary George, who represented an African-American district in 
Milwaukee’s inner city, sought changes in the bill.  George correctly 
perceived that under TIS offenders would serve much more time in 
prison than they had under indeterminate sentencing and wanted to use 
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70 2001 Wis. Act 109 §§ 1114–31; 2003 Wis. Act 33 §§ 2749–51; 2005 Wis. Act 277 §§ 88–89. 
71 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.01(1) (West 2007); Fontaine, supra note 57. 
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the CPSC bill to soften TIS.75  Among other changes, George wanted to 
add provisions allowing judges to modify inmates’ sentences based on 
new information and to adjust the sentences of elderly inmates who 
were not a threat to public safety.76  George’s efforts mostly failed, but he 
did obtain a revision allowing certain offenders to petition the 
sentencing judge for early release after having served 75% or 85% of 
their sentence, depending on the seriousness of their offense.77 
In practice, however, George’s early release provision had little 
effect.  This was so because the pro-punishment forces insisted on a 
provision authorizing the prosecutor and, in some cases, the victim to 
veto any sentence adjustment.78  Prosecutorial vetoes became routine and 
few inmates obtained early release.  The prosecutor’s veto was ultimately 
held to violate the separation of powers and is now void, although the 
statute has not changed.79  The victim’s veto has never been litigated, 
although it too would likely be found unconstitutional.   
George’s holding up of the CPSC bill, however, caused serious harm 
to the thousands of offenders who had the misfortune to be sentenced in 
the two and a half years that elapsed between TIS’s taking effect and the 
enactment of the CPSC bill.  These offenders were sentenced under a 
penalty structure that had not been modified to reflect the abolition of 
parole.  As the reporter for the committee that drafted the CPSC bill 
wrote, “[I]t is difficult to imagine a more dreadful way to transition” 
from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing.80 
At this point, at least for a short period of time, the legislature 
stepped away from TIS.  However, the law had created numerous 
problems that cried out to be addressed.  In 2004, the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel published a series of articles entitled Locked in:  The Price of Truth 
in Sentencing, which focused on the costs of the new law.81  The series 
projected that TIS’s cost would be enormous and pointed out that before 
enacting TIS, the legislature had not bothered to obtain an estimate of the 
fiscal impact that the law would have.82  The series prompted lawmakers 
to promise reforms, but none immediately materialized. 
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In 2008, however, Doyle, who had been elected governor after 
Thompson, became a member of President George W. Bush’s 
administration, and a number of concerned legislators asked the Council 
of State Governments’ Justice Center (“Justice Center”) to study TIS.83  
As governor, Doyle was responsible for paying for TIS, and his attitude 
toward the law changed considerably.  Unsurprisingly, Doyle became far 
less enthusiastic about TIS than he had been when he was attorney 
general and a soon to be candidate for governor.  Although the Justice 
Center did not expressly recommend that parole be reinstated, it might 
as well have in that it proposed that the legislature create a number of 
new vehicles by which inmates could obtain early release from prison.  It 
also recommended limiting ES to 75% of confinement time for most 
offenders and limiting reconfinement time to six months for offenders 
whose ES was revoked for reasons other than having committed a new 
offense.84 
Based largely on the Justice Center’s recommendations, the 
legislature proceeded to enact a TIS reform package.85  The package 
included a number of avenues by which inmates could earn early 
release, and it authorized the Department of Corrections to release non-
violent offenders to ES up to a year prior to their scheduled release date 
and to release elderly prisoners and those with extraordinary health 
conditions.86  It also allowed offenders who successfully completed two 
years of ES to terminate supervision.87 
Unfortunately, each of the various early release programs involved 
different procedures and was governed by different standards.  In 
addition, the programs overlapped.  Thus, prisoners seeking to obtain 
early release, almost all of whom were without counsel, found the 
application process extremely complicated and confusing.  Further, the 
Department of Corrections took several years to come up with 
administrative rules to govern each of the early release programs.  And 
by the time the administrative rules were ready, the effort to reform TIS 
was destroyed entirely.  This was so because, in 2010, Scott Walker 
succeeded Doyle as governor, and the Republicans took control of both 
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houses of the legislature.88  With Walker’s encouragement, the new 
legislature promptly enacted a law repealing almost all of the provisions 
in the Justice Center’s reform package.89 
Thus, after more than a decade of legislating, the TIS law today is 
pretty much the law that Thompson and Walker proposed in the late 
1990s and that the legislature enacted with Doyle’s approval.  As the law 
stands, felons receive a bifurcated sentence consisting of a term of 
confinement and a term of ES.  In determining the length of the 
confinement period, the judge is constrained by the statutory maximum.  
Prisoners typically serve 100% of their term of confinement and 
offenders who violate ES are often re-confined.90  Although there are 
some limits on the length of the initial ES term, many offenders serve 
very long periods of ES.  Obtaining early release is extremely difficult.  
Prisoners with substance abuse problems may obtain early release by 
participating in a boot camp program that pre-dated TIS, but spots in the 
program are hard to come by.  Prisoners can apply for early release after 
serving 75% or 85% of their sentence, depending on their offense, but 
very few succeed.91  Many judges are reluctant to grant early release, and 
offenders can only apply once.  The Department of Corrections may 
release elderly or sick prisoners but rarely does so.92 
As mentioned, Wisconsin’s TIS law is very harsh.  First, unlike many 
jurisdictions which require offenders to serve 75% or 85% of their 
confinement time, Wisconsin requires inmates to serve 100%.93  Second, 
Wisconsin’s law applies not only to offenders who commit violent 
crimes, but to all offenders, including those who commit drug offenses.94  
Third, Wisconsin permits no credit for good time, while at the same time 
it punishes for bad time.  It does so by adding confinement time to the 
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confinement period of an offender who misbehaves.95  Fourth, Wisconsin 
bars offenders whose ES is revoked from receiving sentence credit for 
time they previously served successfully on ES.96  These features set 
Wisconsin’s law apart. 
The law has led to a large increase in Wisconsin’s prison population 
and dramatically affected the state’s budget.  In 2004, the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel estimated that, as the result of TIS, the biennial cost of 
corrections in Wisconsin would rise from $700 million in 1999 to $1.8 
billion by 2025.97  As it turned out, the Journal Sentinel’s estimate was far 
too low.  Walker’s 2011–2013 budget allocated $2.25 billion dollars to the 
Department of Corrections.98  For the first time in history, Wisconsin 
budgeted more money for prisons than for the University of Wisconsin 
System.99  As recently as 1992, the University’s budget was three times as 
large as the state’s corrections budget.100  At present, the only state 
programs that involve larger expenditures than corrections are aid to 
schools and local governments and medical assistance.101 
The Journal Sentinel’s analysis concluded that, aside from cost, TIS 
had other negative effects.  Because of the increased number of prisoners 
and the shortage of prison programming, “thousands of inmates are on 
waiting lists for prison jobs, education and treatment programs.”102  
Wardens reported that TIS led to increases in bad conduct by inmates 
and feelings of hopelessness precipitated by the lack of an opportunity to 
earn good time credit and obtain early release.103  The wardens also 
noted that it was difficult to motivate inmates to participate in substance 
abuse treatment programs while in prison because of the absence of an 
incentive.104  At one prison, 168 offenders refused to take part in a 
treatment program and 131 of these were TIS inmates.105  Of course, 
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prisoners who do not participate in treatment programs are at greater 
risk of substance abuse when released. 
The Journal Sentinel also found that, as a result of TIS, offenders 
served more time in prison both as a result of their original sentence and 
for violations of ES.106  This finding indicated that if judges were 
reducing sentences in response to TIS, they were not reducing them 
enough to offset the effect of TIS’s elimination of parole.  This was 
predictable, notwithstanding that Walker and other TIS proponents 
denied an interest in lengthening offender sentences.  Judges also 
imposed lengthy periods of ES, often substantially more than the TIS 
minimum of 25% of confinement time.107  This, of course, made it more 
likely that offenders would at some point violate the ES portion of their 
sentence.  It is ironic that Milwaukee County judges, who not long before 
had expressed little or no faith in the probation system, frequently 
imposed lengthy periods of ES, thus placing offenders under the 
supervision of the probation system that they so mistrusted. 
The Journal Sentinel also found that, for most inmates, the early 
release provisions had little value.  Ordinary inmates rarely obtained 
early release, and elderly prisoners, even those near death, fared only 
slightly better.108  Inmates over sixty-five can petition for early release if 
they have served five years or more, and prisoners over sixty may do so 
if they have served ten years or more.109  By 2003, the number of elderly 
prisoners exceeded 6,500.110  This led to an enormous increase in 
prisoners’ medical expenses with the cost exceeding $30 million 
annually.111 
The 2009 Justice Center Report reached conclusions similar to the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s.  The Justice Center found that between 2000 
and 2007, Wisconsin’s prison population increased by 14% and that the 
average length of confinement increased by 29%.112  The study projected 
an additional increase in the prison population of 25% by 2019.113  It also 
noted that prisons were overcrowded and that the state would have to 
build additional facilities.114  One cause of the increased prison 
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population was the repeated re-incarceration of offenders on 
supervision.  Under TIS, the average length of post-release supervision 
increased by 135%.115  And, by the end of 2007, more than half the prison 
population consisted of inmates who had violated supervision, a 40% 
increase over pre-TIS numbers.116  In the years since the Justice Center’s 
report, prison admissions have declined, but the prison population has 
continued to increase. 
TIS has particularly undermined Wisconsin’s opportunity to deal 
constructively with low-level drug offenders.  Most drug offenders have 
a substance abuse problem, and many can benefit from effective 
treatment.  Offenders who complete treatment programs are much less 
likely to re-offend than those who do not.117  Thus, good treatment 
programs, both within and outside of prisons, are essential if a state is to 
deal effectively with drug offenders.  As discussed, TIS made it less 
likely that such treatment would be available and that, if it was, 
offenders would take advantage of it. 
The longer incarceration periods brought about by TIS has greatly 
harmed the African-American community in Milwaukee.  Many young 
African-American males experience incarceration, and it has a highly 
negative effect on their life prospects.  Their employment possibilities are 
reduced, they suffer a 30–40% loss of income, their domestic 
partnerships are often ruptured, and their marriage prospects 
undermined.  They also suffer a profound social exclusion, making it 
more likely that they will become recidivists and return to prison.  In 
addition, incarceration divides minority communities, as the experience 
of pervasive imprisonment is generally confined to those who are less 
educated.118 
Thus, TIS has greatly harmed Wisconsin.  In recent years, some 
public officials have begun to understand this and have taken steps to 
mitigate the harm.  For example, policymakers have attempted to 
develop more effective substance abuse treatment programs that can 
serve as alternatives to incarceration.  In the 2005–2007 budget, the 
legislature created a program known as the Treatment Alternatives and 
Diversion (“TAD”) program.119  The legislation authorized “grants to 
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counties to enable them to establish and operate programs, including 
suspended and deferred prosecution programs and programs based on 
principles of restorative justice, that provide alternatives to prosecution 
and incarceration for criminal offenders who abuse alcohol or other 
drugs.”120  The TAD program currently provides funding to seven 
counties, four of which use the money to fund adult drug treatment 
courts.121  The other three, including Milwaukee County, utilize 
diversion models, in which specialists screen non-violent offenders with 
substance abuse problems to determine whether they can be diverted 
into community-based substance abuse treatment programs rather than 
being sent to prison.122 
The program has been quite successful.  Offenders who participate 
in it are much less likely to be convicted of a new offense within three 
years; offenders who complete the program are even less likely to be 
convicted.123  The program is also cost effective.  One analysis concluded 
that every dollar spent on the TAD program brought almost two dollars 
in savings as the result of averted incarceration and reduced crime.124  
The benefits resulting from offenders obtaining employment are 
probably even greater.  Wisconsin could benefit greatly by expanding 
the TAD program and by creating other substance abuse treatment 
programs for offenders.  The 2009 Justice Center Report called for 
expanding drug and alcohol treatment programs for offenders on ES as a 
critical ingredient in a TIS reform package.125  It projected that a 
comprehensive program would save the state some $2.3 billion.126 
Nevertheless, the problem of effectively addressing the problem of 
low-level drug offenders in the context of the TIS law remains.  
Wisconsin policymakers have been aware of this problem since TIS went 
into effect.  Ironically, in its final report, the CPSC noted the “enormous 
consumption of prison resources by those convicted of drug offenses, the 
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inadequacy of treatment programs for those who are both convicted and 
addicted, and the insufficiency of innovative responses to the drug 
problem . . . .”127  The CPSC called for a comprehensive review of the 
state’s drug policies regarding treatment, punishment, and enforcement.  
State policymakers, unfortunately, have never conducted such a review, 
and, after the various revisions of TIS discussed above, the TIS law 
remains much as it was when originally enacted and the issues noted by 
the CPSC remain largely unaddressed. 
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